Towards a Political Conception of Transitional Justice: Testimonial Justice and Epistemic Transitional Justice

This chapter develops a political conception of transitional justice by analyzing how conflicts of expectations about the treatment of the past shape its moral role. I begin by arguing that testimonial injustice is a structural form of injustice that places women in positions of vulnerability to sexual violence. I distinguish this vulnerability from direct interferences with sexual autonomy, a distinction that clarifies why past violations and their impunity occupy a central place in structural transitions.
I then examine the limitations of conceptions of transitional justice grounded in the casuistry of historical transitions. I focus on Colleen Murphy’s influential account of the “circumstances of transitional justice,” which, despite its contributions, introduces historical definitional barriers that obscure the specific moral work of transitional justice.
Building on this critique, I propose the foundations for a political conception of transitional justice by identifying the conflict that defines its role and scope. On this view, transitional justice is best understood as a practice of adjudicating conflicts of expectation regarding how past wrongs are to be addressed.
Finally, I apply this conception to the epistemic transition initiated by the #MeToo movement. This case allows me to differentiate the role of testimonial justice from that of epistemic transitional justice, showing how the framework of transitional justice can illuminate processes that go beyond institutional reforms in post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings, and extend to broader struggles over recognition, vulnerability, and memory.

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