Hearing as we see: rethinking deliberative democracy through epistemic injustice theory

The way in which deliberative democracy is primarily understood in the West is rooted in two traditions of thought centered on the concern for including the interests and perspectives of people and groups within a political community. On the one hand, a political conception of Justice that demands making decisions, including the “public reasons” given by all the interested parties in a discussion. On the other hand, the conception departing from Communicative Ethics and the basic structure of communication, which serves as the basis for people's deliberation and for making decisions “by the force of the best argument”. The first theory has John Rawls as its referent, the second one has Jürgen Habermas at the lead. Notwithstanding, even when revolutionary for democracy and inclusion, both approaches share fundamental problems for those concerned about the material possibilities for the realization of a genuine egalitarian dialogue in practice. Therefore, I first propose a conceptual framework for understanding these problems through an analytical distinction, which I believe helps to clarify them more easily. I then develop the main criticisms of those problems coming from feminist theories. In the second part, I highlight how the theory of epistemic injustice is helpful in explaining what has been overlooked by the dominant deliberative theories. Finally, I explore some conclusions resulting from adopting an alternative conception of deliberation that incorporates the concern for epistemic injustice. 

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