Hate Speech: the subordination and silencing theses

The article examines two central theses in the philosophical discussion of hate speech and pornography: the subordination and silencing theses. The former maintains that certain forms of speech not only represent particular groups as inferior but also constitute acts that unjustly classify them, legitimize discriminatory practices towards them, and deprive them of rights. According to this view, language can function as an exercitive or verdictive speech act which, depending on certain conditions, may have normative effects within the social sphere. The second thesis argues that subordinating speech can prevent victims from fully exercising their freedom of expression, blocking the possibility that certain speech acts—such as sexual refusal or the denunciation of discrimination—be recognized as such and have their expected normative effect. If these theses are correct, certain forms of discourse, such as pornography and racist speech, not only undermine equality but also impair the very freedom of expression of the affected groups.

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