Apuntes acerca de la hipótesis de la percepción directa de los estados mentales

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References

 

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January 1, 2017

How to Cite

Pérez, D., & Lawler, D. (Eds.). (2017). Apuntes acerca de la hipótesis de la percepción directa de los estados mentales. In La segunda persona y las emociones (pp. 249-274). Editorial SADAF. https://doi.org/10.36446/editorialsadaf.4.9