Time, Thought and Vulnerability: An Inquiry in Cognitive Dynamics
Sinopsis
Time, Thought and Vulnerability presents the results of an investigation of the conditions under which certain circumstances that are beyond the knowledge (and therefore, the control) of the agents can affect the validity of inferences whose correctness is supposed to be purely a priori evaluable. The discussion involves a careful examination of the controversy over the compatibility of anti-individualism and the "authority of the first person", within the background of the controversy over the transparency of the mental content and the accessibility of the logical form of inferences. A comparison with the debate on the vicissitudes of preservative memory in a temporalist semantics is articulated by exam-ining the arguments presented by Mark Richard and Paul Boghossian, respectively, against temporalism and anti-individualism. Finally, the debate on the transparency of mental content is dissociated from those two theoretical frameworks (temporalism versus eternism; individualism versus anti-individualism) by engaging in a direct discussion of the pos-tulate of the transoarencv of logical form.
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